CVE-2026-11551

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 16.1 prior to 16.1.6, 16.2 prior to 16.2.9, 16.3 prior to 16.3.7, 16.4 prior to 16.4.5, 16.5 prior to 16.5.6, 16.6 prior to 16.6.4, and 16.7 prior to 16.7.2 in which user account password reset emails could be delivered to an unverified email address.

The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.

macrozheng mall version 1.0.3 and prior contains an authentication vulnerability in the mall-portal password reset workflow that allows an unauthenticated attacker to reset arbitrary user account passwords using only a victim’s telephone number. The password reset flow exposes the one-time password (OTP) directly in the API response and validates password reset requests solely by comparing the provided OTP to a value stored by telephone number, without verifying user identity or ownership of the telephone number. This enables remote account takeover of any user with a known or guessable telephone number.

An issue in DokuWiki 2025-05-14b "Librarian" 56.2 allows a remote attacker to create an account via the register function in inc/auth.php. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because this is the intentional behavior when the product is configured for self-registration (a non-default feature). The supplier also notes that there is no configuration migration scenario that would result in the self-registration being enabled without the administrators knowledge.

The Invoice Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Account Takeover via Password Reset in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.0. This is due to the `pravel_invoice_change_password()` function being registered as a nopriv AJAX handler with no nonce verification and no authorization check, and performing a loose equality comparison between the supplied `reset_activation_code` POST parameter and the target user's stored `forgot_email` user meta — a check that trivially evaluates to true (`'' == ''`) for any user who has never initiated a forgot-password request, which applies to administrators under normal conditions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply an arbitrary user ID via the `reset_user_id` POST parameter, bypass the activation code check entirely by omitting `reset_activation_code`, and set the target account's password to an attacker-chosen value, enabling full takeover of any account on the site, including administrator accounts.

A static password reset token in the password reset function of DDSN Interactive Acora CMS v10.7.1 allows attackers to arbitrarily reset the user password and execute a full account takeover via a replay attack.