CVE-2026-34454

Improper Authentication (Authentication Bypass) exists in Neterbit NW-431F Router 20241014-IR03 and before. The router uses a weak/predictable cookie value for authentication. By modifying the cookie value (e.g., setting it to "admin"), an attacker can bypass the authentication schema and gain unauthorized access to admin functionalities.

Default configurations of Apache Shiro have a session fixation vulnerability. This issue affects Apache Shiro from 1.0 to 2.1.0, and 3.0.0-alpha-1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.1, or 3.0.0-alpha-2 or later, which fixes the issue. In the affected versions, when a session already exists, it is not invalidated upon successful login, nor is a new session being generated with a new ID.

OpenBao is an open source identity-based secrets management system. Prior to version 2.5.2, OpenBao does not prompt for user confirmation when logging in via JWT/OIDC and a role with `callback_mode` set to `direct`. This allows an attacker to start an authentication request and perform "remote phishing" by having the victim visit the URL and automatically log-in to the session of the attacker. Despite being based on the authorization code flow, the `direct` mode calls back directly to the API and allows an attacker to poll for an OpenBao token until it is issued. Version 2.5.2 includes an additional confirmation screen for `direct` type logins that requires manual user interaction in order to finish the authentication. This issue can be worked around either by removing any roles with `callback_mode=direct` or enforcing confirmation for every session on the token issuer side for the Client ID used by OpenBao.

Catalyst::Plugin::Authentication versions before 0.10_027 for Perl is susceptible to session fixation attacks. Catalyst::Plugin::Authentication does not automatically change the session id after authentication. An attacker that obtains a session id cookie can use this to impersonate the victim.

Gradio before version 6.15.0 contains a cookie injection vulnerability that allows remote attackers to perform cross-Space session fixation by exploiting a shared module-level HTTP client used across all users in the reverse proxy endpoint. Attackers controlling any HF Space can return a parent-domain cookie that the shared client stores and automatically replays into all subsequent proxy requests to other legitimate Spaces, affecting all users of the same Gradio deployment.

The Azure Active Directory (AAD) authentication implementation contained multiple weaknesses in its OAuth 2.0 authorization flow that could allow attackers to bypass important security guarantees provided by the protocol. The application used the PHP session identifier (session_id()) as the OAuth state parameter. Because session identifiers are long-lived authentication credentials, exposing them in OAuth redirect URLs could leak valid session tokens through browser history, HTTP Referer headers, reverse proxies, access logs, or third-party infrastructure involved in the authentication flow. If obtained by an attacker, the leaked session identifier could potentially be used for session hijacking. Additionally, the implementation did not regenerate the session identifier after successful authentication, leaving authenticated sessions susceptible to session fixation attacks where an attacker forces a victim to use a known session identifier before login and later reuses that identifier after authentication. The OAuth state value was also not implemented as a dedicated, single-use nonce. This weakened CSRF protections and increased the risk of replay attacks against the OAuth callback process. The authentication flow further failed to enforce HTTPS for the configured OAuth redirect URI. If a non-HTTPS redirect URI was used, OAuth authorization codes and access tokens could traverse the network in plaintext, exposing sensitive credentials to network attackers. Finally, OAuth error responses containing attacker-controlled GET parameters were logged verbatim. An attacker could inject control characters or crafted log content, leading to log forging, log injection, or corruption of audit records. The fix introduces: * A dedicated cryptographically random OAuth state value. * Single-use state validation and invalidation. * Constant-time state comparison using hash_equals(). * Session identifier rotation after successful authentication. * Enforcement of HTTPS-only redirect URIs. * Sanitized and length-limited logging of OAuth error parameters. AAD Authentication Plugin (OAuth 2.0 / Azure Active Directory integration)