CVE-2026-54269

MuPDF before 1.27.0-rc1 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the EPUB CSS rendering engine that allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service by supplying a maliciously crafted EPUB file with deeply nested HTML elements and inline CSS styles. The function value_from_inheritable_property() in css-apply.c recurses through the CSS property inheritance chain without a depth limit, exhausting the process stack and causing a crash in any application using MuPDF for EPUB rendering.

protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. Prior to 7.6.1 and 8.4.1, protobufjs could recurse without a depth limit while converting decoded messages to plain objects or JSON. This affected generated toObject() conversion and the custom google.protobuf.Any JSON conversion path. A crafted protobuf binary payload containing deeply nested Any values could cause the JavaScript call stack to be exhausted during conversion to JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.6.1 and 8.4.1.

MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePackReader.TrySkip() recursively descends into nested arrays and maps without incrementing the reader depth or calling the configured depth checks. This bypasses MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth, the library's documented protection against deeply nested object graphs. Many generated and dynamic formatters call reader.Skip() when they encounter unknown map keys, unknown array members, ignored fields, or data that should be skipped for forward compatibility. A deeply nested value in one of these skipped positions can therefore cause unbounded recursion and an uncatchable StackOverflowException. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.

MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in FromJsonCore() without consulting MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth. TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken() recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls ToJsonCore() without applying MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader). Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.

MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by DynamicUnionResolver do not call MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader) and do not decrement reader.Depth around recursive deserialization and skip paths. This means union deserialization does not consistently participate in the maximum object graph depth enforcement that protects other recursive formatter paths. For unknown union keys, the emitted deserializer calls reader.Skip() on attacker-controlled data without an enclosing depth step. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.