CVE-2026-6412

A vulnerability was detected in skypilot-org skypilot up to 0.12.0. Impacted is the function username.encode of the file sky/users/server.py of the component User ID Handler. The manipulation results in use of weak hash. The attack may be performed from remote. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.

The ML-KEM ARM64 NEON ciphertext comparison only compares half of the input, breaking the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform's implicit rejection and weakening IND-CCA2 security on that code path. The constant-time comparison effectively ignored part of the re-encrypted ciphertext, so a decapsulating party could fail to detect a manipulated ciphertext and proceed without the standard's required implicit rejection.

The Setracker2 Android Companion App (com.tgelec.setracker) versions 3.1.5 and earlier uses MD5 to generate a request signature for authenticating communications between the mobile client and the backend REST API. Attackers could potentially reverse the signature to recover the session ID. With the session ID exposed, an attacker could impersonate the legitimate user and issue authenticated API requests.

Wss4jSecurityInterceptor defaulted allowRSA15KeyTransportAlgorithm to true, overriding Apache WSS4J's safer default for validation RequestData. Inbound WS-Security decryption could therefore accept RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (rsa-1_5) encrypted key material unless operators explicitly reconfigured the flag. Affected versions: Spring Web Services 5.0.0 through 5.0.1; 4.1.0 through 4.1.3; 4.0.0 through 4.0.18; 3.1.0 through 3.1.8.

Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.