CWE-444

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope["server"]` for malformed values.

SAP NetWeaver Application Server ABAP, SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java, ABAP Platform, SAP Content Server 7.53 and SAP Web Dispatcher are vulnerable for request smuggling and request concatenation. An unauthenticated attacker can prepend a victim's request with arbitrary data. This way, the attacker can execute functions impersonating the victim or poison intermediary Web caches. A successful attack could result in complete compromise of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of the system.

An HTTP Request Tunneling vulnerability found in Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows for versions May 2023 Patch 3 and earlier, February 2023 Patch 7 and earlier, November 2022 Patch 10 and earlier, and August 2022 Patch 12 and earlier allows a remote attacker to elevate their privilege by tunneling HTTP requests in the raw HTTP request. This allows them to send requests that get executed by the backend server hosting the repository application. This is fixed in August 2023 IR, May 2023 Patch 4, February 2023 Patch 8, November 2022 Patch 11, and August 2022 Patch 13.

Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows before August 2023 Patch 2 allows unauthenticated remote code execution, aka QB-21683. Due to improper validation of HTTP headers, a remote attacker is able to elevate their privilege by tunneling HTTP requests, allowing them to execute HTTP requests on the backend server that hosts the repository application. The fixed versions are August 2023 Patch 2, May 2023 Patch 6, February 2023 Patch 10, November 2022 Patch 12, August 2022 Patch 14, May 2022 Patch 16, February 2022 Patch 15, and November 2021 Patch 17. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-41265.

Inconsistent interpretation of http requests ('http request/response smuggling') in ASP.NET Core allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network.

Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.6, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.46 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.66 did not correctly parse the HTTP transfer-encoding request header in some circumstances leading to the possibility to request smuggling when used with a reverse proxy. Specifically: - Tomcat incorrectly ignored the transfer encoding header if the client declared it would only accept an HTTP/1.0 response; - Tomcat honoured the identify encoding; and - Tomcat did not ensure that, if present, the chunked encoding was the final encoding.

Rouille 0.3.3 through 3.6.2 contains an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that allows remote attackers to bypass access controls by injecting bare line feed characters (0x0A) into client-supplied request header values that are copied verbatim to upstream connections without validation. Attackers can craft a header value containing a complete additional HTTP request that is interpreted as a separate request by backends such as Go net/http and Python http.server, causing the backend to process a smuggled request with attacker-chosen method, path, and headers that bypasses the rouille handler's access control logic.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Rouille 0.3.3 through 3.6.2 contains an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that allows remote attackers to desynchronize HTTP message boundaries by exploiting improper header forwarding in the proxy implementation. The proxy in src/proxy.rs forwards the client's Transfer-Encoding header to upstream backends unchanged while transmitting a body already de-chunked by tiny_http, enabling CL.TE desynchronization attacks where attackers control where the backend believes the request body ends.

tiny-http through 0.12.0 contains an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that allows remote attackers to desynchronize request framing by sending a Transfer-Encoding header with any value, including non-chunked codings, which causes the library to unconditionally apply chunk-decoding and discard Content-Length. Attackers can exploit the discrepancy between tiny_http's improper Transfer-Encoding parsing and a correctly-implemented front-end proxy to produce two distinct interpretations of a single byte stream, enabling request smuggling, and can additionally send non-chunked bodies with non-chunked Transfer-Encoding values to cause failed body reads that tie up connections and consume worker threads without signaling errors to clients.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final, Netty incorrectly parses quoted strings in HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding extension values, enabling request smuggling attacks. Versions 4.1.132.Final and 4.2.10.Final fix the issue.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows a Content-Length header to be accompanied by a second Content-Length header, or by a Transfer-Encoding header.

Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.1.124.Final, and 4.2.0.Alpha3 through 4.2.4.Final, Netty incorrectly accepts standalone newline characters (LF) as a chunk-size line terminator, regardless of a preceding carriage return (CR), instead of requiring CRLF per HTTP/1.1 standards. When combined with reverse proxies that parse LF differently (treating it as part of the chunk extension), attackers can craft requests that the proxy sees as one request but Netty processes as two, enabling request smuggling attacks. This is fixed in versions 4.1.125.Final and 4.2.5.Final.

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.