Authlib: community verdicts

Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.9, a JWK Header Injection vulnerability in authlib's JWS implementation allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge arbitrary JWT tokens that pass signature verification. When key=None is passed to any JWS deserialization function, the library extracts and uses the cryptographic key embedded in the attacker-controlled JWT jwk header field. An attacker can sign a token with their own private key, embed the matching public key in the header, and have the server accept the forged token as cryptographically valid — bypassing authentication and authorization entirely. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.9.

Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. From version 1.6.5 to before version 1.6.7, previous tests involving passing a malicious JWT containing alg: none and an empty signature was passing the signature verification step without any changes to the application code when a failure was expected.. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.7.

Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to version 1.6.9, a library-level vulnerability was identified in the Authlib Python library concerning the validation of OpenID Connect (OIDC) ID Tokens. Specifically, the internal hash verification logic (_verify_hash) responsible for validating the at_hash (Access Token Hash) and c_hash (Authorization Code Hash) claims exhibits a fail-open behavior when encountering an unsupported or unknown cryptographic algorithm. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass mandatory integrity protections by supplying a forged ID Token with a deliberately unrecognized alg header parameter. The library intercepts the unsupported state and silently returns True (validation passed), inherently violating fundamental cryptographic design principles and direct OIDC specifications. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.9.

Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.6.10 and 1.7.1, Authlib's OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint can be turned into an unauthenticated open redirect when a request uses an unsupported response_type and supplies an attacker-controlled redirect_uri. The vulnerable behavior happens before client lookup and before any redirect URI validation. As a result, an attacker does not need a valid client registration, an authenticated user, or any prior state. A single request to the authorization endpoint is enough to obtain a 302 Location response to an arbitrary attacker-controlled URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.6.10 and 1.7.1.