Praison: community verdicts

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.90, execute_code() in praisonai-agents runs attacker-controlled Python inside a three-layer sandbox that can be fully bypassed by passing a str subclass with an overridden startswith() method to the _safe_getattr wrapper, achieving arbitrary OS command execution on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.90.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.15 to before version 4.5.69, the --mcp CLI argument is passed directly to shlex.split() and forwarded through the call chain to anyio.open_process() with no validation, allowlist check, or sanitization at any hop, allowing arbitrary OS command execution as the process user. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.69.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the AgentService.loadAgentFromFile method uses the js-yaml library to parse YAML files without disabling dangerous tags (such as !!js/function and !!js/undefined). This allows an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that, when parsed, executes arbitrary JavaScript code. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by uploading a malicious agent definition file via the API endpoint, leading to remote code execution (RCE) on the server. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the create_agent_centric_tools() function returns tools (like acp_create_file) that process file content using template rendering. When user input from agent.start() is passed directly into these tools without escaping, template expressions in the input are executed rather than treated as literal text. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.90, run_python() in praisonai constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into python3 -c "<code>" and passing it to subprocess.run(..., shell=True). The escaping logic only handles \ and ", leaving $() and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.90.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, the get_all_user_threads function constructs raw SQL queries using f-strings with unescaped thread IDs fetched from the database. An attacker stores a malicious thread ID via update_thread. When the application loads the thread list, the injected payload executes and grants full database access. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.115, execute_code() in praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools defaults to sandbox_mode="sandbox", which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted __builtins__ dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (blocked_attrs of python_tools.py) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list (__traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, and f_builtins). Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python builtins dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which exec can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.115.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.97, the PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at /ws and serves agent topology at /info with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.97.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.115, the A2U (Agent-to-User) event stream server in PraisonAI exposes all agent activity without authentication. The create_a2u_routes() function registers the following endpoints with NO authentication checks: /a2u/info, /a2u/subscribe, /a2u/events/{stream_name}, /a2u/events/sub/{id}, and /a2u/health. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.115.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.95, FileTools.download_file() in praisonaiagents validates the destination path but performs no validation on the url parameter, passing it directly to httpx.stream() with follow_redirects=True. An attacker who controls the URL can reach any host accessible from the server including cloud metadata services and internal network services. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.95.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, MCPToolIndex.search_tools() compiles a caller-supplied string directly as a Python regular expression with no validation, sanitization, or timeout. A crafted regex causes catastrophic backtracking in the re engine, blocking the Python thread for hundreds of seconds and causing a complete service outage. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.97, SubprocessSandbox in all modes (BASIC, STRICT, NETWORK_ISOLATED) calls subprocess.run() with shell=True and relies solely on string-pattern matching to block dangerous commands. The blocklist does not include sh or bash as standalone executables, allowing trivial sandbox escape in STRICT mode via sh -c '<command>'. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.97.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.97, OAuthManager.validate_token() returns True for any token not found in its internal store, which is empty by default. Any HTTP request to the MCP server with an arbitrary Bearer token is treated as authenticated, granting full access to all registered tools and agent capabilities. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.97.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.5.90, passthrough() and apassthrough() in praisonai accept a caller-controlled api_base parameter that is concatenated with endpoint and passed directly to httpx.Client.request() when the litellm primary path raises AttributeError. No URL scheme validation, private IP filtering, or domain allowlist is applied, allowing requests to any host reachable from the server. This issue has been patched in version 4.5.90.