CVE-2026-42606

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 16.1 prior to 16.1.6, 16.2 prior to 16.2.9, 16.3 prior to 16.3.7, 16.4 prior to 16.4.5, 16.5 prior to 16.5.6, 16.6 prior to 16.6.4, and 16.7 prior to 16.7.2 in which user account password reset emails could be delivered to an unverified email address.

The LatePoint plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Account Takeover via Weak Password Recovery Mechanism in the unauthenticated guest booking flow in versions up to, and including, 5.5.0 This is due to the save_connected_wordpress_user() function propagating a LatePoint customer's email address to its linked WordPress user account via wp_update_user() without any ownership verification, combined with the guest booking flow's ability to overwrite an existing customer's email through phone-based merge without authentication. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the email address of a non-super-admin WordPress user account that is not yet linked to a LatePoint customer, enabling full account takeover by subsequently triggering the standard WordPress password-reset flow to the attacker-controlled address granted the plugin is configured with WordPress user integration enabled, phone-based contact merging, and customer authentication disabled. Administrator accounts on single-site installs are not affected.

The Branda plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation via account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.29. This is due to the plugin not properly validating a user's identity prior to updating their password. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change arbitrary user's passwords, including administrators, and leverage that to gain access to their account.

macrozheng mall version 1.0.3 and prior contains an authentication vulnerability in the mall-portal password reset workflow that allows an unauthenticated attacker to reset arbitrary user account passwords using only a victim’s telephone number. The password reset flow exposes the one-time password (OTP) directly in the API response and validates password reset requests solely by comparing the provided OTP to a value stored by telephone number, without verifying user identity or ownership of the telephone number. This enables remote account takeover of any user with a known or guessable telephone number.

The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.

An issue in the login and reset password functionality of Backdrop CMS v1.22.0 allows attackers to enumerate usernames via password reset requests and distinct responses returned based on usernames.