CVE-2015-4495

Langflow versions up to and including 1.6.9 contain a chained vulnerability that enables account takeover and remote code execution. An overly permissive CORS configuration (allow_origins='*' with allow_credentials=True) combined with a refresh token cookie configured as SameSite=None allows a malicious webpage to perform cross-origin requests that include credentials and successfully call the refresh endpoint. An attacker-controlled origin can therefore obtain fresh access_token / refresh_token pairs for a victim session. Obtained tokens permit access to authenticated endpoints — including built-in code-execution functionality — allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code and achieve full system compromise.

Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.4.5, the MCP SSE server defaults to an empty secret (`process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? ''` at `bin/mcp-server.ts:89`), which causes `_isAuthorized` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254`) to return `true` unconditionally for every request — no `Authorization` header is required. Simultaneously, `_handleRequest` sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272`) on every response, so a cross-origin browser fetch can read the result without restriction. An unauthenticated attacker who can lure a user to a malicious web page can invoke all 22 exposed MCP tools — including `config_set`, `agent_spawn`, and `blackboard_write` — against a default-configured localhost server. Version 5.4.5 patches the issue.

The Remote App module in Liferay Portal Liferay Portal v7.4.3.4 through v7.4.3.8 and Liferay DXP 7.4 before update 5 does not check if the origin of event messages it receives matches the origin of the Remote App, allowing attackers to exfiltrate the CSRF token via a crafted event message.

In MLflow version 3.9.0, the MLflow Assistant feature introduced improper origin validation in its /ajax-api endpoints. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to exploit cross-origin requests from a malicious webpage to interact with the MLflow Assistant running on a victim's local machine. By bypassing the loopback-only restriction, the attacker can modify the Assistant's configuration to enable full access, which in turn allows the execution of arbitrary commands via the Claude Code sub-agent. This issue is resolved in version 3.10.0.

In AWS Auth manager, the origin of the SAML authentication has been used as provided by the client and not verified against the actual instance URL.  This allowed to gain access to different instances with potentially different access controls by reusing SAML response from other instances. You should upgrade to 9.22.0 version of provider if you use AWS Auth Manager.

Impact: When using Socks5ProxyAgent, undici reuses a single connection pool across different origins without verifying that the pool's origin matches the requested origin. All requests are dispatched through the pool connected to the first origin, regardless of the intended destination. This causes cross-origin request routing: credentials and request data intended for origin B are sent to origin A, responses from the wrong origin are trusted, and HTTPS requests may be silently downgraded to HTTP. Impacted users are applications that use Socks5ProxyAgent (directly or via setGlobalDispatcher) and make requests to more than one origin. This was introduced in undici 7.23.0 via PR #4385 and affects all versions through 8.1.0. Patches: Upgrade to undici v7.26.0 or v8.2.0. Workarounds: Use a separate Socks5ProxyAgent instance per origin, or avoid using Socks5ProxyAgent with multiple origins.