CVE-2026-15041
Is CVE-2026-15041 real, exploitable, or a false positive? Here's the community verdict.
signals
public sources
Moderate signals. Triage by your actual exposure and reachability.
baseline read
auto · not a community verdict
Low signal — verdict needed
Few public signals point to active risk. Whether a scanner hit here is a true or false positive depends on your version and config — community verdicts decide.
Based on CVSS · FIRST EPSS
Confirm or dispute →CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
A flaw was found in 389 Directory Server. The PBKDF2-SHA256 password verification function uses standard memcmp() for comparing password hashes instead of a constant-time comparison function. A remote attacker could potentially use timing measurements of LDAP bind attempts to infer partial hash information, though practical exploitation is extremely difficult due to PBKDF2 computational overhead.
References
Published
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Field notes & remediation
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No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation or public exploit was found for this yet.
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